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“Banks properly established and conducted are highly useful to the business of the 
country, and will doubtless continue to exist ….. so long as they conform  to their laws 
and are found to be safe and beneficial”. Martin Van Buren 
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Abstract 
Mitigating bank fragility provokes interest from governments, regulators, economists, 
and academia because have a “special role” in the development of an economy, hence 
the search for effective risk management tools. Basel framework provides risk 
management tools that use capital requirements, supervision and market discipline. 
However, this study examines the impact of regulatory capital requirements and 
macroeconomic variables on net interest margin (efficiency), equity to total assets 
(solvency), liquidity and growth to total assets for Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Tanzania and Uganda in the periods 1999 to 2014.  
Given that the Basel Accords were initially designed for OECD countries; the argument 
is that they are not suited for African countries because they restrict the development 
agenda set by governments. However, the trend and regression analysis indicate that 
regulatory capital ratio has a significant impact on the equity to total assets ratio, 
liquidity and net interest margin demonstrating their effectiveness in minimising bank 
fragility. Conversely the results show that regulatory capital ratio does not have an effect 
on the growth to total assets, indicating that banks should be able to lend out to 
households and private sector to stimulate economic development. Additionally, the 
results show that an increase in GDP growth, a declining inflation rate, a falling real 
interest rate and an appreciating exchange rates have a significant influence on the 
financial soundness indicators. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
It is postulated that compliance to the Basel regulation reduces financial fragility and 
consequently bank failures. Following the 2007 financial crisis which emanated from the 
banking system, the banking regulation framework under Basel came under a lot of 
scrutiny, with critics apportioning some blame to weak regulation (in the form of the 
Basel Accords) and the ineffective risk management tools that failed to detect 
weaknesses in the banking system well before the system broke down. Moreover, the 
cost of financial crises has been recently estimated at fifteen percent (15%) to twenty 
percent (20%) of GDP (Hoggarth & Saporta, 2002). The huge costs associated with 
financial system failures have prompted policy makers and regulators to increase 
regulation and risk management guidelines to minimise financial fragility and bank 
failures. 
In their search for effective regulation and risk management guidelines, policy makers 
and regulators in both OECD and developing countries have turned to the Basel 
Accords. Until 2010, the Basel Committee had representation from ten OECD countries 
known as the G10. The representation has grown to twenty-seven member countries 
and includes a few countries from the emerging markets. Because of the composition, 
critics argue that the Accords are more suited to OECD countries. The impact of their 
adoption by African banking systems is yet to be interrogated and understood. 
Banking theories postulate that banks play a crucial economic role of reallocating 
surplus resources to where they are needed in the economy. In order to carry out this 
role known as intermediation, banks perform “special” functions such as the collection 
and retention of customer information, provision of credit to critical sectors of the 
economy, create mechanisms which give them ability to re-pay depositors on demand, 
mitigate risks arising from liquidity, price fluctuations, maturity mismatches and bear the 
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high transaction costs (Saunders & Cornett, 2006). In addition to performing these 
“special” functions, the main objective for the existence of banks is to maximise 
shareholder returns. In pursuing this objective, banks bear inherent risk which if not 
actively managed threaten not only the existence of one institution but can destabilize 
the entire financial system. It is essential that regulators provide effective risk 
management guidelines to support the banking systems in pursuing their commercial 
objective whilst managing associated risks. 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
The study will contribute to the existing literature by studying the consequences of 
implementing Basel Accords in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), a scholarship space where 
most current related literature mainly deals with the developed markets and developing 
countries from other regions of the world. The study will be of interest to regulators and 
policy makers who would want to further their understanding; of the appropriateness of 
Basel Accords for banking systems in Africa in mitigating financial sector risks whilst 
supporting growth. 
1.3. Research questions 
The scope of the study is confined to the investigation of the impact of Basel Accords on 
the African banking system. The specific research objectives are aimed at examining: 
1. The role of banks in the context of African economies. 
2. The main causes of bank fragility and attendant government responses. 
3.  The impact of the Basel regulatory capital requirements on African Banks. 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The financial sector in sub-Sahara Africa is largely under-developed in a region with a 
huge deficit in development. There is limited literature that examines the impact of Basel 
accords in the region in as-far-as their impact on the role of banks as intermediaries 
within the ambit of development. Banks have a role in the mobilization of capital and its 
allocation. Thus, banks play a significant role in the financial system and ensure that 
businesses and consumers have access to capital primarily through loans and other 
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credit provisioning instruments. The effect of regulations is to restrict activities that are 
perceived to expose the banks to risks that might result in their failure. These activities 
may range from loan concentration, fraud, complex off balance sheet transactions and 
poor quality assets.  
 
If banks in Africa are exposed to these risks it is logical that complying with the Basel 
Accords will assist in mitigating the risks of bank failures. The study compliments the 
existing literature by; 
 
1. Studying the trends in the main financial indicators of a sample of banks from 
selected jurisdictions for a period before and after the implementation of capital 
accords.  
2. Examines which dependent variables are more susceptible to changes in Basel 
regulatory capital requirements and the impact. 
3. Analyze the variables to gauge the impact of regulatory capital requirements under 
Basel on bank’s intermediation role. 
1.5. Context to the Basel Accords 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision came out of the financial crises that 
ensued the breakdown of the Bretton Woods managed exchange rate system in 1973. 
In response to the financial crises the central bank governors of the G10 countries 
established a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices at the end 
of 1974. The committee became known as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The Committee‘s mandate is to enhance bank supervision and regulation 
with the main objective of deepening financial stability.  
After the global financial crises of 2007 - 2008, the effectiveness of Basel Accords in 
maintaining financial stability was put in doubt, because it failed to detect the 
weaknesses in the system way before the crises erupted. As demonstrated by the 
global financial crises, a crisis which started off in the US as a subprime mortgage 
crisis, quickly turned into a global “melt down”. The crises revealed that the risks of 
contagion have grown over the years due to increased global financial integration, a 
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phenomenon that Stiglitz (2010) argues is not optimal. In contrast to other regions of the 
world where the financial systems were destabilized, the global financial crises entered 
the African economies via the trade, credit and aid channels. Consequently, questions 
were raised on the relevance of the Basel Accords to African Banks.  This study 
attempts to answer the research questions by assessing the impact of the Accords on 
minimizing bank fragility. 
 
1.6. Theoretical framework 
There are several theories that underpin financial fragility with intermediation explaining 
the existence of banks and postulating that intermediaries exist because they are able 
to reduce transactional costs and information asymmetry. Information asymmetry 
attempts to explain adverse selection and moral hazard in tandem with Agency theory. 
Agency theory can be applied in financial contracting and regulation and is crucial in 
minimizing financial fragility as demonstrated by the role that agencies played in 
precipitating the global financial crises of 2007-2008.  
The concepts of financial fragility goes back as far as the 1930s when Keynes and 
Fisher developed theories that linked the financing of investments and the spread of 
shocks in an economy. In recent years some authors including Allen and Gale (2003), 
Lagunoff & Stacey (2000) have extended the definition of financial fragility as a situation 
when a financial system is susceptible to a financial crisis. They define it as when a “…. 
large-scale financial crises, is caused by small, routine economic shocks” (Lagunoff & 
Stacey, 2000). Gropp & Heider (2010) define the negative distance to default as a good 
measure of bank fragility.   
 
There are several financial indicators that can be used to measure and predict bank 
fragility. Bongini et al (1999) recommend the simultaneous use of accounting data, 
stock market price and credit ratings indicators to assess bank fragility, whilst Estrella et 
al (2000) and Cole & Gunther (1995) give the view that regulatory capital, net income, 
poorly performing assets are good predictors of bank failures. On the other hand 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (1997) and Hardy, D., & Pazarbasioglu, C. (1998) 
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give the following macroeconomic indicators; low GDP growth, high inflation rate, high 
real interest rates and declining exchange rates as good indicators of bank fragility. 
Banking systems by their very nature have been described as financially fragile 
(Krugman, 2010), because their capital structures are susceptible to shocks and 
subsequent runs and failures. The fragility of the capital structures arises from the fact 
that the asset side of banks constitute the loans made to borrowers, a crucial function of 
intermediation which, extends credit to the economy. The liability side, provides liquidity 
on demand to depositors. The combination of these activities illustrates that banking is a 
business of managing risk which is often used as the basis for justifying regulation. A 
lack of confidence in the banking system can become of source of financial fragility 
(Diamond, 2007). 
1.7. Bank fragility and Basel Accords 
Because of the negative economic widespread impact associated with bank failures in 
some cases; policy makers and regulators are confronted with the challenges of 
designing a well-functioning integrated financial network that has effective “circuit 
breakers” (Stiglitz, 2010). Basel regulatory capital can be considered a shock absorber 
that has been put in place to manage the risk of contagion. The focus of regulators on 
capital requirements as a tool to manage financial soundness stems from the inherent 
risks associated with bank capital structures. According to Diamond & Rajan (1999) 
financial fragility is a desirable feature of banks, it is about finding the optimal capital.  
In contrast to the views of bank capital structures as being a source of financial fragility, 
Minsky (1977) argues that financial fragility is an inherent feature of the normal business 
cycles (characterized by booms and slumps) of economic activity in a market economy 
and allude to the fact that financial fragility arises from a situation where the allocation of 
resources moves in ways that are not related to economic fundamentals (Cass & Shell, 
1983). 
 
Fragility in the banking system is not only linked to the structure of the bank’s capital 
structure but to other factors in the form of financial liberalisation (de-regulation), 
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exchange rates regimes and global economic/financial shocks. Chandrasekhar, (2005) 
highlights that financial liberalization makes developing countries vulnerable to financial 
shocks and further dilutes ownership of domestic assets in favor of foreign ownership. 
Other authors postulate that fixed exchange rates regimes may introduce the problem of 
moral hazard leading to financial fragility (Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999).  Given that 
the world economy is more integrated, fragility in the financial system can emanate from 
a source outside a country’s borders.  In most instances the causes of bank failure can 
be traced to poor capital adequacy, low quality of assets, weak management, poor 
asset liability management and sensitivity to interest rate risks.  
Evidence from the well documented financial crises is that financial crises can result in 
economic recessions, bank failures, sudden and sharp irreversible currency 
depreciation, hyperinflation, unemployment and even civil unrests which can lead to 
overthrow of governments. Hence, there is need for policy makers and regulators to 
promptly respond in the face of financial crises with effective regulation and risk 
management tools.  
There is however, no standard or best practice to resolve financial crises which result in 
bank failures.  Policy makers and regulators have used a wide array of responses to 
financial crises including regulation, structural reforms, fiscal cost reduction and others 
(Laeven & Valencia, 2008). In response to these factors, the Basel Accords introduced 
minimum regulatory capital, supervision, market discipline and global liquidity standards 
for the banking sector. 
1.8. Research Methodology 
The study uses an empirical analysis and panel regression model to address the 
research questions. The panel regression model used in the study is adapted from 
Naceur & Kandil (2013). The study focuses on commercial banks in Botswana, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda for the period, 1999 to 2014. 
The dependent variables denoting bank fragility were selected based on the 
recommendations of Bongini et al (1999), Estrella et al (2000), Cole and Gunther (1995) 
and Brownbridge (1998) and the independent variables (regulatory capital ratios and 
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macroeconomic)  were influenced by the works of Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. 
(1997) and Hardy, D., & Pazarbasioglu, C. (1998) and Brownbridge (1998). The panel 
regression model is captured in the equation; 
BF𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
BF𝑖𝑡    bank fragility (non interest margin, liquidity, equity to 
total assets, growth to total assets) 
𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡   is total capital ratio of the bank as defined under Basel 
framework 
𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 GDP 
𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡  inflation rate 
𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡:  real interest rates 
𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 :  Exchange rate of the country in local currency against 
US dollars. 
𝛽6dummy0   , 𝛽7dummy1    is the dummy variable that equals 1 for each year after 
the implementation of Basel and 0 before the 
implementation. 
 
 
1.9. Data Collection Method 
The relevant data for the study are collected from Bankscope data base which has 
information on public and private banks throughout the world; Financial Stability Institute 
Survey (2014) a database that gives a list of countries and their status and progress on 
Basel implementation; Laeven & Valencia (2008) Systemic Banking Crises and the 
World, a data base that lists the major financial crises per country and also provides the 
causes of the crises and  finally the World Bank data base. 
1.10. Summary of Study Findings and Limitations of the Study  
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Results from the study suggest that implementing Basel regulatory capital has a strong 
positive influence on the net interest margin (efficiency), liquidity and equity to total 
assets (solvency) indicating its impact in minimising bank fragility. Surprisingly the 
results also suggest that Basel regulatory capital requirements does not have an effect 
on the growth to total assets, indicating that banks should be able to lend out to 
households and private sector to stimulate economic development. Additionally, the 
results show that rising GDP growth, declining inflation rate, falling interest rate and 
appreciating exchange rates have a significant influence on the financial soundness of 
banks.  
The limitations of the study are mainly from the limited and incomplete data on the 
performance indicators ratios on Bankscope, hence the restricted sample selection.  
1.11. Dissertation outline 
The rest of the dissertation outline chapters is arranged as follows: chapter 2 presents 
the literature review with a special focus on the relationship between regulation, bank 
capital structures, foreign exchange and financial liberalization on bank fragility and 
special characteristics of the Basel Accords.  Chapter 3 gives the research methodology 
and explains the dependent and independent variables applied in the study to measure 
the impact of the Basel regulatory capital requirements on African banks. Chapter 4 
presents the results and the interpretation of the trend and regression analysis. Chapter 
5 outlines the conclusions drawn from the results and interpretation from previous 
chapter and addresses the research questions on how the regulatory capital framework 
has impacted the role of intermediation in Africa. The final section of the dissertation 
presents the references and appendices.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The first section of the chapter outlines the theoretical framework, then investigates the 
role of financial regulation in banking markets, the relationship between; fragility and 
financial regulation, bank capital structure and fragility, foreign exchange and fragility, 
financial liberalization and fragility and finally the impact of the global financial crises on 
the African banking system.  
The second section reviews Basel I, II and III, and examines the shortcomings of the 
Accords and their application to African banking systems.  The third section studies the 
available literature on the impact of the Basel Accords on bank fragility, reviews the 
methodologies and summary and research gap.  
2.2. Theoretical framework 
Intermediation, efficient market hypothesis and agency theories attempt to explain the 
need for regulation as a relevant mechanism in financial systems stability. In a perfect 
market there would be no need for intermediaries, information will simultaneously be 
available to all players and there will be no transaction costs, there would be no conflict 
between an agent and a principal. However, in imperfect markets, intermediaries collate 
information analyze it and make it available at a price to market participants. 
Intermediation and agency theory assist in understanding the risks associated with 
information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard. The theories inform 
elements in the process of minimizing financial fragility as a basis for the formulation of 
regulation to manage the risks of information asymmetry and moral hazard.  
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Figure 1: Overview of theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. The role of financial regulation 
Macroeconomic stability plays a crucial role in minimizing systemic risks and financial 
fragility. Kaufman (1996) postulates that attaining macroeconomic stability is always 
difficult, making prudential regulation a relevant mechanism in minimizing bank failures 
because it brings in effective tools of detecting or predicting failures before they happen. 
Vuckovic (2010) maintains that effective regulation should have the ability to protect 
market participants and investors as well as preserve financial stability. The 
shortcomings of theories such as efficient market hypothesis, agency and 
intermediation build a strong case for the justification of financial regulation because 
there are no perfect markets.  
Theories: 
Theory of fragility 
Theory of Efficient Market 
Hypothesis 
Theory of intermediation 
Theory of delegated monitoring 
Managerial Incompetence 
Market conduct 
Weak Regulation 
Prudential regulation 
Fragility 
Adverse selection 
Macroeconomic Instability 
Information asymmetry 
Weak asset management 
 Bank Failure 
Basel Accords 
Fraud 
Moral hazard 
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Stiglitz (2010) suggests that regulation in the form of capital adequacy is relevant to 
create “circuit breakers” to minimize fragility and the risk of contagion. Vuckovic (2010)) 
maintains that global financial regulation is necessary and effective in mitigating the risk 
of bank failures. Weak regulation is blamed for the problems of moral hazard and 
information asymmetry which ultimately led to the global financial “melt down” of 2007. 
Rodríguez, (2003), Barth et al (2013), and Das et al (2003) contend that the quality of 
the financial regulation and the ease of implementation is very important. They assert 
that compliance to financial regulation has become a long, heavy and politicized matter, 
thus the need for financial regulation that is robust and incorporates not only capital 
adequacy standards but other standards in the form of supervision, market discipline 
and regulatory governance.  
Regulatory compliance can be deemed good if it mandates accurate information 
disclosures, empower private sector control and provide incentives that promote private 
sector corporate control for enhancing bank stability. In a similar vein, Tadesse (2006) 
finds that the likelihood of banking crises decreases in countries with regulatory 
frameworks that prescribe extensive bank disclosures and strict auditing. On the other 
hand Africa faces a myriad of challenges in its economic development agenda. Africa 
struggles with sound macroeconomic policies, governance, legal and regulatory 
frameworks, legislation and regulation that has the resources, independence and 
capability to enforce. (Laderkarl &  Zervos, 2004).   
Regulation can have unintended consequences; such as driving consumers to the less 
regulated markets of informal lenders (loan sharks) Boyfield (2009). Furthermore, Jones 
(2000) explains regulatory arbitrage, as a situation when banks move into the less 
regulated markets offering innovative products to the high risk segments which may 
offer temporary high returns, but without adjusting their regulatory capital requirements 
to reflect the economic risk. This presents a challenge to regulation because it 
undermines the relevance of capital accords and Basel risk management tools in 
mitigating bank failure.  
2.4. Indicators of fragility and its causes 
 12 | P a g e  
 
In the process of minimising fragility, it is important to understand what the key 
indicators of assessing bank fragility. Bongini et al (2002) maintain that the main 
indicators that can be used to assess fragility from available public information are; 
credit ratings, stock market data and balance sheet information (capital adequacy, asset 
quality, earnings and liquidity). In addition, they included the indirect cost of deposit 
insurance of a bank and assert that there is a direct correlation between insurance with 
bank risk. Gropp et al (2004) add the prices of securities to complement the balance 
sheet data to assess fragility. Their argument is that market prices may incorporate all 
available information into one price and their findings shows that the distance to default 
and the subordinated debt spread are useful indicators to assess fragility. Capital 
adequacy and leverage ratios have also been used in separate studies to evaluate 
fragility and predict bank failures. 
 
Cole & Gunther (1995) and Thomson (1991) highlight that capital adequacy, poor 
quality assets, net income, liquidity and solvency are a good measure of bank fragility. 
Cole & Gunther (1995) further argue that liquidity, large certificate deposits and asset 
size are not good indicators of fragility whilst Gropp & Heider (2010) show that bond 
spread can be a good indicator of financial fragility.  
Brownbridge, (1998) gives the main causes of bank distress in Africa as nonperforming 
loans arising from concentration of ownership, undercapitalisation of banks, lending to 
risky borrowers at high interest rates and macroeconomic instability. Withal, Heffernan, 
(2003) suggests that financial fragility may be a result of weak asset management, 
managerial problems, the role of the regulator, poor product knowledge and too big to 
fail. 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1997) and Hardy & Pazarbasioglu (1998) suggest that 
financial fragility occurs when the macroeconomic environment is characterized by low 
GDP growth rates, high inflation rates, and high real interest rates, declining exchange 
rates, high credit exposure, high capital outflows and poor law enforcement.  
In the case of the global financial crises, the main causes of fragility emanated from 
imprudent lending, sub-prime mortgages, off balance sheet activities, rating agencies, 
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weak risk management tools, lending concentration, insufficient governance, lack of 
diversification and lack of transparency (Jickling, (2010) and Ragalevsky & Ricardi 
(2009). 
In their data base for systemic bank crises Laeven & Valencia (2008) explain that there 
is no one way or best practises in dealing with bank fragility and systemic bank crises. 
Government response in dealing with systemic banking crises has varied across 
countries and has included; extensive liquidity support, nationalisation of banks, 
guarantees, asset purchases, deposit suspensions and bank holidays.  
2.5. Relationship between fragility and financial regulation 
Fragility can be categorized at a national and institutional level. Country level fragility is 
determined by various factors including GDP growth rates, real exchange rates, real 
interest rate, inflation rates, fiscal policy, credit growth and financial depth whilst bank 
fragility is determined by factors such as size of the bank, ownership, liquidity and asset 
growth. According to Barth et al (2013) regulation that requires accurate information 
disclosures can enhance financial stability. Whilst poor regulation that influences credit 
standards and rules may deepen the problem of financial fragility (Basu, 2003). 
Banking crisis in one institution is more damaging to the economy because of risks of 
contagion that can lead to widespread bank failures in the economy and across borders 
and eventually growing into a full blown global financial crises. The fear of systemic risk 
is the huge cost associated with bank failures. Hence proponents of financial regulation 
such as economists, the BIS and policy makers need to contain systemic risk as the 
basis for justifying regulation.  
Whilst regulation has demonstrated that it can work in minimizing fragility, the financial 
crises of 2007 exposed the flaws in the existing regulation. Despite regulatory 
compliance the world economies experienced a global financial crisis.  
2.6. Bank capital structure and fragility 
There is a wide array of literature that illustrates that bank capital structures are by their 
nature fragile and susceptible to runs and failures (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), Saunders 
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& Cornett, 2006, Diamond & Rajan1999). The asset side of banks constitute the loans 
made to borrowers, a crucial function of intermediation which, extends credit to the 
economy. The liability side, provides liquidity on demand to depositors, hence banks 
have to always match the maturities of its assets a function which has inherent risk. 
Bank capital structures are inherently fragile because of the problem of mismatch of 
maturities, deposits withdrawal are on demand and the liquidity needs of depositors is 
not always known (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). 
 
Based on Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s theory, which states that in a perfect capital 
market, a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant. In imperfect capital markets, the value of a 
firm is strongly correlated to its financing mix. Because of their intermediary role, banks 
would most likely keep as little as possible of their capital so as to maximize their 
returns, making their capital structure fragile and susceptible to failures. Regulatory 
capital requirements have been created to provide a level playing field and to protect 
depositors ‘money in the event of bank failures.  
 
Diamond & Rajan (1999) and Gambacorta & Mistrulli (2004) argue that holding high 
capital reduces the bank’s liquidity but it gives the banks the ability to withstand 
situations of uncertainty and distress. A view that is disputed by Blum (1999) who 
argues that regulatory capital may lead banks into taking excessive risk and might not 
motivate them to stay in business in the event that they are not making profits. 
 
However, Diamond & Rajan (1999) argue that financial fragility is a desirable feature of 
banks, banks have to simply find the optimal capital structure wherein they can 
maximise shareholder returns. Bank capital is meant to be a barrier against periods of 
macroeconomic volatility, hence raising the levels of capital a bank holds should assist 
banks in stabilising the banking system, thus reducing the incidence of huge costs of 
bank failures (BIS, 2004). 
 
2.7. Exchange rate and fragility 
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Whilst financial fragility is determined by a wide host of variables, foreign exchange 
rates play a significant role in African countries. This is because countries in sub – 
Sahara Africa still use pegged and fixed exchange rate regimes. The aforementioned 
foreign exchange rate regimes are filled with moral hazard.  Eichengreen & Housman‘s 
(1999) theories on exchange rates and financial fragility suggest that pegged exchange 
rates offer indirect insurance against exchange risk, thus encouraging  reckless lending. 
Chang & Velasco (2000) report similar results in a world were banks play a well-defined 
role, the different types of exchange regimes bring different degrees of financial fragility.   
 
2.8. Financial Liberalisation and fragility 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) argue that financial liberalisation may increase the 
likelihood of financial fragility especially in the absence of strong institutional 
environments. African countries are known to have weak institutional frameworks 
characterised by inefficient government and bureaucrats, corruption, poor law 
enforcement, poor property rights et al, hence understanding the impact of liberalisation 
is important in studying the causes of financial fragility. Basu (2003) suggest that 
financial liberalization increases competition which in turn may reduce the profitability of 
banks and disincentivize banks from maintaining financial stability. Conversely, 
Shehzad & Haan (2009) argue that financial liberalisation can decrease the probability 
of systemic crises in the banking sector. 
2.9. Impact of the global financial crises of 2007 -2008 
Global crises can transfer financial fragility and crisis into other economies as witnessed 
by the global financial crises of 2007-2008. The initial view was that Africa is not deeply 
integrated into the global financial system, its financial markets are largely 
underdeveloped, foreign borrowing by banks is largely regulated, limited diversification 
of stock (Kasendeke et al 2009), hence the impact of the crises was expected to be 
minimal. However, empirical evidence shows that the crises was transmitted into Africa 
via the trade, credit and aid flow channels. The impact of the global financial crises led 
to a fall in commodity prices which is the main source of foreign exchange reserves for 
African countries. This lead to a fall in foreign exchange reserves a situation which was 
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exacerbated in countries that rely on importing food and fuel. During the crises years, 
sub-Sahara Africa experienced increases in food and fuel prices, which decreased their 
foreign exchange reserves and made it difficult for them to pay for imports and to 
sustain growth (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011).  
 
Thus, the global financial crises of 2007 was more acutely transmitted into sub-Sahara 
Africa through the trade channel and less through the financial system. It can be 
inferred that maybe the African banks were able to withstand the crises, firstly with 
assistance of multilateral institutions programmes for some banks but most because of 
the high regulatory capital they held. Secondly, they had not participated in risky 
financial derivatives that were the primary cause of the crisis.  
2.10. Basel Accords, impact and shortcomings 
The main objectives of the Basel Accords are: to promote a financially sound global 
banking system; to deepen competition in the financial markets and to provide a 
comprehensive framework for managing risk. 
Basel I 
The Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) came into effect in 1988. It was divided into four 
pillars namely the constituents of capital, risk weights, target standard ratios and the 
implementation framework.  
 
The constituents of capital were designed to minimize credit risk and required that 
international banks hold a regulatory minimum capital of eight percent (8%) of their risk 
weighted assets (RWA).  The reserve capital is divided into Tier 1 which is the core 
capital and includes owner’s equity and retained earnings. Tier 2 covers supplementary 
capital; general loan-loss provisions, undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, 
hybrid debt/equity instruments, subordinated term debt (5+ year’s maturity) (BIS, 2011).   
 
The second pillar addressed the risk weights and assets on the balance sheet were 
grouped into five risk weights. The risk weights grouped under zero percent (0%) are 
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considered riskless and include assets such as cash held by a bank. The second group 
considered to be of low risk assets carries twenty percent (20%) risk weight and is 
comprised of assets such as multilateral development bank debt. The moderate risk 
assets carrying a fifty percent (50%) weighting includes residential mortgages, whilst the 
fourth group carrying a hundred percent (100%) weighting constitutes equity assets held 
by a bank, Eurobonds and bank’s claims on private sector. The fifth category addressed 
the risk weights of domestic entities and can be grouped into zero percent (0%), ten 
percent (10%), twenty percent (20%), and fifty percent (50%) and is determined by the 
central bank.  
 
The third pillar speaks to a target standard ratio and combines the first and second 
pillar. It defines the global standards where Tier 1 and Tier 2 must cover eight percent 
(8%) of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. Thus, capital is expressed as total tier capital 
ratio ≥ 8% and tier 1 capital ratio ≥ 4% (tier 1 capital should cover four percent (4%) of a 
bank’s risk-weighted assets). 
 
The fourth pillar in Basel 1, helped to set the implementation framework of the Accords 
and was referred to as the transitional and implementing agreement. It addressed the 
role of the central banks in implementing and monitoring of the Accords. 
 
Basel II  
Basel II was designed as a response to the banking crises of the 1990s. It enhanced the 
minimum regulatory capital required and added two pillars that defined the supervisory 
and market discipline roles. Under the minimum regulatory capital pillar, the total capital 
required should not be lower than eight percent (8%).  Moreover, pillar one outlines the 
methodology to calculate required capital to mitigate against credit, operational and 
market risk.  
The methodology used to calculate capital reserves under credit risk are the 
standardized and the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach. The standardized method 
adds the market based rating agencies approach to the risk weights defined in Basel I. 
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Claims on sovereigns, central banks, corporates and banks are rated as illustrated in 
the table below. 
 
Table 2: Sovereign and corporate claims 
Credit 
assessment 
 
AAA to AAA- 
 
A+ to A- 
 
BBB+ to BBB- 
 
BB+ to BB- 
 
B- 
 
Unrated 
Risk weight O% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
 
Short-term bank debt with less than three months’ maturities is weighted at below a 
sovereign bond such that BB+ debt is given a fifty percent (50%). Home mortgages 
carry a risk weight of thirty-five percent (35%), whilst corporate mortgages have a 
hundred percent (100%) weighting. 
 
The Internal Rating Based approach has the foundation and the advanced approach. It 
incentivizes banks to develop their own internal systems to measure risk. If they raise 
their risk weighted reserves by six percent (6%), the Committee can lower their capital 
requirements hence increasing the opportunity to make more profit. The advanced 
Internal Rating Based approach is very complex and tends to be used by very large 
banks that already have complex risk models. 
 
Basel II prescribes the approach in calculating the required minimum capital to minimize 
operational risk as the Basic Indicator, the Standardized and the Advanced 
Measurement approach. The Basic Indicator Approach requires that a bank should hold 
capital equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the average gross income earned by a 
bank over a period of three years. Regulators may calibrate the fifteen percent (15%) 
according to their risk assessment per each bank. The Standardized Approach, defines 
the amount of cash a bank must hold in order to minimise operational risk based on the 
lines of business it has. The Advance Measurement approach is built to bring in a 
component of market discipline and self-monitoring by the banks. It allows the banks to 
calculate their own capital reserve to manage operational risk. Based on Basel II, 
market risk capital reserves can be calculated by the use of the Value at Risk (VaR) 
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method. Under the VaR methodology banks are allowed to formulate their own 
calculations to determine the reserves required to mitigate against interest rate risk on 
fixed assets. On the other hand banks that are not able to use VaR can use an alternate 
method which assigns interest rate weights to fixed assets. 
 
The second pillar under Basel II addresses the supervisory role and calls for the 
supervisory authorities to review the methods used to calculate the capital reserves to 
manage the aforementioned risks and also to manage the problems of maturity 
mismatches. The supervisors are required to take action where it’s deemed that a 
bank’s approach falls short of the standards. 
 
The third pillar introduced market discipline in the form of required disclosures and 
transparency. The BIS stipulates that a bank’s disclosures should be aligned with how 
senior management and the board of directors evaluate and oversee the risks of the 
bank. 
 
Basel III 
Basel III was developed to enhance bank regulation, bank supervision and risk 
management. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). It was a response to 
the 2007 global financial crisis and the need to address the weaknesses emanating 
from Basel II. The changes were mainly aimed at improving micro prudential regulation 
at a bank level and macro prudential regulation in building more resilient banks and 
minimizing system wide risks triggered by pro-cyclicality and interconnectedness of 
financial institutions.   
In addition to strengthening the capital requirements, Basel III introduced the leverage 
and liquidity coverage ratio so as to improve the banking sector's ability to withstand 
economic shocks.  
2.11. Impact of the Basel accords  
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Several authors have empirically tested the relationship between the regulatory capital 
requirements and credit supply, regulatory capital and minimizing bank failure. There 
are theories that underpin the relationship which stipulate that if banks are not able to 
meet the minimum regulatory capital requirements, they will reduce the credit supply to 
private sector and households. A view that is shared by Beck & Cull (2013) when they 
argue that holding high capital may reduce the credit supply to the private sector and 
households hence curtailing economic development  
In contrast Diamond & Rajan (1999) in their theory stipulate that whilst holding high 
levels of capital decreases the liquidity of a bank, it enables the bank to withstand stress 
and survive crises. A view that is shared by Gambacorta & Mistrulli (2004) when they 
suggest that a well capitalised banks can withstand shocks coming from monetary 
policies and GDP variations. They can withstand these shocks because they can easily 
access non–deposit funds, thus one cannot assess the impact of capital regulation 
without examining the effects of GDP.  
VanHoose (2007) build a theoretical argument that the short term effects of complying 
to regulatory capital is the likelihood of fall in total lending, an increase in marketing loan 
rates and a move away from lending to holding alternative assets. High capital holdings 
offer protection to depositors from losses in the event of a systemic bank failures. 
Cumming & Nel (2005) in their study of banks in South Africa show that capital accords 
may lead to a decrease in credit supply to the private sector and increase the costs of 
loans. Their study further revealed that there was a decline in the risky assets such as 
mortgages and unsecured lending to private sector. However the restriction of 
mortgages interferes with the government housing policy which is a fundamental 
variable in the development agenda of the government. South Africa has already 
experienced service delivery protests due to the lack of delivery of houses and other 
services to masses by the government.   
Similarly Chiuri et al (2002) analyzed developing countries and found that the minimum 
regulatory capital requirements does indeed negatively impact credit supply in 
developing countries. Their findings show that banks in developing countries will find it 
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much simpler to adhere to regulatory capital by reducing the extent of their exposure 
than going to financial markets to raise capital. Capital markets in Africa are still very 
shallow and hence it’s difficult to raise capital. It is in developing country where credit is 
mostly needed to support development. 
Griffith-Jones et al (2003) agree with the observation that capital accords may lead to a 
reduction in the supply of credit and an increase in the cost of lending to developing 
countries. The reduction in lending to developing countries may have detrimental effect 
on developing countries, because developing countries heavily rely on the borrowed 
funds form the high income countries. 
In their study conducted in the US, Rossi (1999) and Sagner (2010) found that the 
implementation of Basel II resulted in the reduction in lending and increased cost of 
bank capital, cost of implementation and distorted the competitive environment. 
Conversely, Barajas et al (2004) in their study done in Latin America show that there 
was no overall decline in the credit supply after the implementation of Basel. However, 
the growth of loans became more sensitive to some risk factors and credit supply 
became more susceptible to procyclicality. 
2.12. Shortcomings of the Basel Accords in the context of Africa 
The main criticism of the Basel Accords from the emerging economies is that their 
interests are not well represented in the Committee and that the Committee does not 
take into consideration the specialness of their markets.  
Consequently the high risk weights attached to long term emerging market debt 
encourages hot money transactions leading to a massive drain of foreign funds.  
Additionally, the weights overestimated the risks of commercial and sovereign loans to 
emerging markets and significantly reduced the loan-deposit ratios in emerging 
countries (Abdel-Baki, 2012)  
 
However the Accords are much more than regulatory capital requirements, thus Africa 
finds itself faced with new challenges in complying with the supervision, risk 
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management tools and the market discipline requirements. Given that Africa has weak 
regulatory and legislative framework, it is even more challenging to comply. Gottschalk 
(2008) alluded that key challenges faced by banks in Africa are: lack of technical skills 
and expertise to validate models and monitor their use; participation of foreign banks; 
competition; procyclicality; collaboration between home and host supervisors and credit 
portfolio concentration and credit to SMEs. 
Systemic risk can arise from the adoption of the IRB approach, as this is likely to 
increase procyclicality, thus increasing the probability of crises. They argue that banks 
in developing countries are likely to face increased competition from internationally 
active banks who are compliant with the Basel IRB approach and who have finely tuned 
their capital requirements. The Accords might result in consolidation and acquisitions of 
smaller banks (Griffith-Jones & Spratt, 2003).  
 
The use of the bank’s internal risk management system brings the issue of pro-
cyclicality1.The push to use risk weights to accurately reflect the probability for default is 
inherently pro-cyclical in that during an upswing the probability for default will decrease 
and the motive to lend will go up vice versa. In an economic down swing the risk of 
default will increase leading to a credit crunch that will directly affect the highly rated 
borrowers (Griffith-Jones & Spratt, 2001). 
Another source of pro-cyclicality is the risk weights which are heavily dependent on the 
credit ratings from external credit agencies. Blum & Hellwigg, (1995) illustrate that 
agency ratings always lag behind markets, assessing historic performance hence 
aggravating pro-cyclicality. They also argue that risk grades are largely biased towards 
short term lending and short term lending is very sensitive to macroeconomic shocks 
and can therefore further worsen economic crises. 
Access to financial services including deposits, credit and payments is still very low in 
Sub-Sahara Africa. The financial sector can play a crucial role in the economic growth 
and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa by providing credit and other financial 
                                                          
1
Procyclicality can magnify the effect of economic cycles hence increase the frequency and magnitude of 
economic crises 
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products and services to enterprises, especially small and medium ones (Mlachila et al). 
The penetration level of banking products and services is very low at five percent (5%) 
and cash is “king” as it is still the major financial instrument. African banks earn a much 
higher net interest margin; have high non-performing loans to total loans ratio and have 
high overhead costs compared to those in high income countries and in other regions 
(Beck and Cull, 2013). 
2.13. Relationship between bank fragility and regulatory capital ratio and 
macroeconomic variables 
This section reviews the literature and establishes the relationship between the 
variables. Regulatory capital requirements and economic growth have a positive and 
significant impact on efficiency (Poshakwale & Qian, 2011).  Chiuri et al (2002) indicate 
that an increase in regulatory capital requirements leads to a decrease in growth of 
assets. However, Blum, (1999) indicate that regulatory capital requirements does not 
stop banks from lending to higher risk segments or taking higher risks.  
Currency depreciation increases the likelihood of nonperforming loans denominated in 
domestic currency (Naceur & Kandil (2013). For the periods post Basel regulatory 
capital requirements implementation there is a significant and positive increase in the 
growth of banks’ equity.  
High inflation can increase the likelihood of high non-performing loans or the probability 
for making “windfall” profits (Brownbridge, 1998). 
Negative macroeconomic shocks have a significant and negative impact on liquidity and 
bank financial soundness (Arena, M. (2008). Bank capitalization and credit expansion in 
Latin America increased after Basel regulatory capital implementation indicating a 
significant and positive impact (Barajas et al 2004). Cole & Gunther (2005) show that 
low capital, weak assets, and net income, have a significant impact on the timing of 
bank failure whilst bank liquidity, investment securities and large certificates of deposit 
do not have a significant impact on bank failure. To stimulate growth in loan volumes, 
government can reduce interest rates especially in situations of economic downturns 
(Berka & Zimmerman (2001). 
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2.14. Research gap and summary 
There is a wide array of literature on the impact of Basel regulatory capital. Findings 
presented in the literature vary from region to region and focuses largely on the impact 
of regulatory capital requirements on credit supply and cost of loans. This study 
attempts to complement the existing literature by assessing the impact of regulatory 
capital on bank efficiency, solvency, liquidity and the growth of assets.   
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Chapter 3 
Research methodology  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of the study is to examine the impact of adopting the regulatory capital 
requirements from the Basel framework for African banks by addressing the research 
questions mentioned in chapter one. This chapter describes and explains the, sample 
countries and banks, period under study, data sources, research methodology, 
dependent and independent variables, and the rationale for the selection of the 
variables.   
 
3.2. Selection of the sample 
The selection of the sample is highlighted in table 6. Banks were selected on the basis 
of the availability of data for the period 1999 to 2014 in Bankscope. The date of 
implementation of the capital adequacy requirements differs across the countries: 
Botswana, 2013; Kenya, 2013; Mauritius, 2008; Namibia, 2010; South Africa, 2010; 
Tanzania, 2014 and Uganda, 2004 (Financial Stability Institute Survey, 2015).   
 
Table 2: Number of banks in the sample 
Country Sample 
period 
Basel 
Implementation 
Number 
of banks 
Size in total assets 
(% to commercial 
total bank assets) 
Botswana 2000-2014 2013 5 90% 
Kenya 2000-2014 2013 10 70% 
Mauritius 2002-2014 2008 9 58% 
Namibia 2004-2014 2010 4 97% 
South Africa 2004-2014 2010 4 80% 
Tanzania 2006-2014 2014 14 70% 
Uganda 1999-2014 2004 9 84% 
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Source:  FSI survey, 2014 and Bankscope 
 
3.3. Data sources  
The data was collected from Bankscope, Laeven & Valencia (2008) Systemic Banking 
Crises, Financial Stability Survey, 2015 and the World Bank and IMF data base.  
3.4. Research design and econometric model 
The methodology used in this study is adapted from Naceur & Kandil (2013). In order to 
examine the impact of the Basel capital framework on bank indicators the author 
gathered panel data of banks’ financial ratios in seven countries forming the sample. 
Whilst Naceur & Kandil (2013) focused on real change in total assets, net loans over 
total assets and bank’s holding of sovereign securities over total assets, this study 
examines net interest margin, liquidity, equity to total assets and growth to total assets. 
The selection of the indicators was largely influenced by the literature reviewed which 
suggested these are key indicators for measuring fragility. The methodology is divided 
into three parts: 
 
Part I Empirical analysis 
An analysis is carried out using empirical data on key financial soundness indicators as 
defined by the World Bank; financial depth, financial accessibility, financial efficiency, 
regulatory compliance, competitiveness, stability and profitability (Beck et al, 2009).  
The analysis compares the financial soundness indicators for sub- Sahara Africa 
against the performance of the other five regions; East Asia & Pacific (developing only), 
Europe & Central Asia (developing only), Latin America & Caribbean (developing only), 
Middle East & North Africa (developing only) and Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only). 
 
Part II Trend analysis 
A trend analysis is carried out on the panel data from the five financial ratios (dependent 
variables) for the sample countries. The financial ratios were grouped into two 
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categories; pre and post Basel regulatory capital implementation. The averages for 
each category was calculated and then plotted into a graph to show the trends for the 
period before and after the regulatory capital implementation.  
 
Part III Regression model 
To test the impact of the regulatory capital requirements, a panel regression model was 
constructed and used. The panel regression model has the dependent variables: net 
interest margin, liquidity, equity to total assets, growth to total assets. The independent 
variables comprise of the total capital ratios, GDP, inflation rate, real interest rate and 
exchange rates.   
The regression model used is: 
BF𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The model defines bank fragility as the dependent variable. The model is broken down 
into four equations with each control variable captured into an equation.  
Equation 1 
NIMR𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 2 
LR𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 3 
ETAR𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 4 
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GTA𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6dummy0  
+ 𝛽7dummy1   + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
BF𝑖𝑡   bank fragility 
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 − 𝑃. 𝐵𝑖𝑡  
 
 
𝛽1TCR𝑖𝑡 is total capital ratio of the bank 
𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 GDP of the country 
𝛽3Inf𝑖𝑡  the country inflation rate 
𝛽4RIR𝑖𝑡  country real interest rates 
𝛽5ExchR𝑖𝑡  Exchange rate of the country in local currency against 
US dollars. 
𝛽6dummy0  , 𝛽7dummy1    Dummy variable that equals 1 for each year after the 
implementation of Basel and 0 before the 
implementation. 
NIMR𝑖𝑡 is the net interest margin ratio for the bank 
LR𝑖𝑡  is the liquidity ratio of the bank 
ETAR𝑖𝑡 = equity to total assets ratio of the bank 
GTA𝑖𝑡  growth to total assets of the bank 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term 
 
3.5. Data description 
Net interest margin ratios (NIMR) 
This is a measure on the efficiency of the bank and influences the bank’s ability to pay 
out interest to its depositors in relation to the amount of interest they earned on their 
assets. A high net interest margin indicates cheaper funding or high margins. It is 
calculated by diving net interest revenue over total earnings. 
Liquidity ratio (LR) 
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It influences the bank’s ability to pay its short term liabilities obligations and is measured 
by dividing liquid assets over customer and short term borrowings. The higher the ratio 
the more its ability to meets it’s short term obligations. It can also be used to predict the 
likelihood of bank failures. 
Equity to total assets (ETAR) 
It gives the amount of protection the bank can afford via the equity invested and gives 
an indication on the solvency position of the bank. It tests the soundness of the bank’s 
capital structure. A high equity to total assets ration shows that a company has a strong 
long-term solvency position. 
Growth to Total Assets (GTA) 
Total assets are depicted in the accounting equation which states that assets = liabilities 
+ shareholder's equity.  
 
On the other hand the independent variable used in this study is the regulatory capital 
ratios as represented by total capital ratio, GDP, inflation and real interest rates.  
 
Explanation of the independent variable 
The independent variables where selected because they have been identified as major 
causes of bank fragility by Brownbrige (2014), Estrella et al Park, 2000 Laeven & 
Valencia (2008). 
Total capital ratio (TCR) 
The capital ratio is very closely related to the likelihood of bank failures and has been a 
widely used tool in assessing a bank’s soundness. It measures a banks’ capital in 
relation to its risks. It gauges the ability of a bank to meets it funding liabilities 
timorously, hence influences the probability of bank failure. If the ratio is high it indicates 
that a bank can withstand sudden deposit withdrawals. Total capital ratio is more robust 
and is calculated by dividing the sum of tier1 and tier 2 capital over total risk weighted 
assets. 
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GDP growth (GDP) 
 A falling GDP reflects a decline in the market value of all the goods and services 
produced in a country signaling economic downturns. GDP can be used as a predictor 
of bank failures. 
 
Inflation rate (Inf) 
High inflation presents challenges in loan appraisal processes, the future value of loan 
security becomes unpredictable. The greater the probability of loan default the greater 
the probability of a bank failure. 
 
Real Interest rate (RIR) 
Real interest rates influence the price of loans hence customer demand for bank loans. 
It also impacts the bank’s ability to loan out money at a profitable rate. 
 
Exchange rates (Exchange R) 
Depreciating exchange rates can be a source of fragility, where in the value of the 
assets falls, deteriorating the bank’s asset portfolio.  
Table 3: Relationship between bank fragility and regulatory capital ratio and 
macroeconomic variables 
Independent variables Expected relationship 
Total capital ratio increase Positive 
GDP increase Positive 
Decrease in inflation rate  Positive 
Falling real interest rate increase Positive 
Exchange rates appreciation Positive 
Source: Lynda Kahari (2016) 
3.6. Statistical package  
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The regression model was run in a statistical package known as Gretl (Gnu Regression, 
Econometrics and Time-series Library). It is an open-source statistical package that is 
mainly used for econometrics. 
3.7. Data analysis 
The author collected cross stacked panel data of the financial indicators per bank in 
each country from Bankscope. To minimize the problem of missing data, the sample 
selected was from the areas with the most populated data. Periods with insufficient data 
was eliminated. The data was imported into Gretl where the regression model was run 
using fixed effects. Fixed effects was selected after the Hausman test showed that the 
results under random effects were inconsistent and insignificant. The data was tested 
for correlation so as to minimize the problem of spurious results and the correlation 
coefficient showed that they were insignificant. In addition the model was tested for 
significance using the F statistic.  
3.8. Summary 
The research methodology attempts to answer the research questions using empirical, 
trend and regression analysis and focuses on the behaviour of bank fragility against 
rising GDP, decreasing inflation rate, falling interest rates and appreciating exchange 
rates. The results of the analysis is presented in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4 
Results and Analysis 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The results and interpretation section is divided into three; the first section attempts to 
address the research question, what is the role of banks in the African bank context? 
And the second section answer the research question, what are the main causes of 
bank fragility?  Finally, the third section attempts to answer the question, what is the 
impact of adopting the Basel regulatory capital requirements on African banks? 
4.2. The role of banks in the African banking system 
Research question one – what is the role of banks in the African context is answered 
under the literature review and from the empirical analysis done on the financial 
soundness indicators. 
Figure 2: Africa financial soundness indicators 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
According to the stylized facts financial system is one of the most regulated sectors in 
most economies and banks are the most important intermediary among debt market 
institutions. The number of accounts per 1000 adults is the lowest amongst all the 
regions showing that a majority of the population in sub-Sahara Africa is under banked 
or not banked at all. Banks hold the smallest financial deposits to GDP % compared to 
other regions.  Cost to income ratio is high and in some instances almost at par with 
banks in high income and other regions. Banks enjoy high net interest margin and high 
lending deposit spread. 
4.3. Causes of bank fragility 
The second research question, on what are the causes of bank fragility and attendant 
government response is addressed in the literature review and the empirical analysis.  
Based on the literature reviewed the main causes of bank fragility emanate from both 
endogenous and exogenous factors. Exogenous sources of bank fragility emanate from 
macroeconomic instability; fall in GDP growth, high inflation rates, rising real interest 
rates, declining exchange rates, financial liberalization, weak law enforcement 
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institutions, negative trade shocks, weak regulation and ineffective banking supervision 
and increased competition.  
 
Internal factors that determine bank fragility can be traced to incompetent management, 
poor credit standards rules, increased lending to high risk borrowers, insider lending 
and excessive risk emanating from high regulatory capital requirements, excessive 
credit expansion, low profits, and poor product knowledge on new offerings, low liquidity 
and bank capital structures. 
 
Empirical evidence given in the graphs below shows that banks in sub-Sahara Africa 
enjoy high net interest margin, high lending deposit spread and hold high non-
performing loans and high regulatory capital to risk weighted assets. However, the 
financial system deposit to GDP is the lowest among other regions. Banks enjoy high 
profits and are deemed stable. Concentration risk is high and banks are considered 
competitive based on the Boone indicator. 
Figure 3: Africa financial soundness indicators 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development data base, 2015 
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4.4. Impact of adopting the Basel regulatory capital requirements for African 
banks 
Responses for research question three on the impact of the Basel regulatory capital 
requirements on African Banks is derived from the trend and regression results.  The 
blue line in the graphs below annotated as (0) represents the period pre- Basel and the 
orange line annotated as (1) represents the period post-Basel. 
Table 4: The effect of Basel regulatory capital on net interest margin  
 
The net interest margin ratio decreased in the period post implementation of Basel in 
the samples for all countries, Kenya, Namibia and Uganda, whilst it increased for the 
samples for Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa. 
Table 5: The effect of Basel regulatory capital total capital ratio  
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Total regulated capital ratio increased marginally for the sample for Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa post Basel regulation implementation. On the other 
hand, it fell slightly for the sample for all countries, Tanzania and Uganda in line with the 
views that Africa already holds high levels of capital. 
Table 6: The effect of Basel regulatory capital on liquidity  
 
In the period post the implementation of Basel regulation the liquidity ratio dropped 
significantly for the samples for all countries, Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Uganda, whilst Namibia increased slightly. 
 
Table 7: The effect of Basel regulatory capital on equity to total assets ratio  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
All
countries
Botswana Kenya Mauritius Namibia South
Africa
Tanzania Uganda
Total Capital ratio
TCR(0) TCR(1)
 43 | P a g e  
 
 
Following the implementation of the Basel regulation, the equity to total assets ratio 
(solvency) increased for the sample for all countries, Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda. 
Table 8: The effect of Basel regulatory capital on growth to total assets  
 
The growth to total assets ratio after the implementation of Basel regulation shows a 
mix, it dropped for the samples for Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda, whilst it 
remained almost the same for the samples for all countries, Botswana and Namibia. On 
the other hand, South Africa experienced an increase in the growth of assets.  
Table 9: The effect of Basel regulatory capital on non-performing loans 
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Post the Basel implementation the performance for non-performing loans decreased for 
the samples for Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania, whilst it 
increased for Namibia and Uganda. 
The regression results given below are summarized in table 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
 4.5. The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank efficiency        
The results show a mixed bag with regulatory capital giving a positive and significant 
coefficient at 1% significance level for Namibia and for all countries and 10% 
significance level for Mauritius indicating an increase in the net interest margin.  
The dummy variable in the sample for Botswana shows a significant and positive 
coefficient at 10% which conveys a favorable improvement in the net interest margin of 
banks in the periods post Basel implementation.  
South Africa has a positive and significant GDP coefficient at 1% indicating an increase 
in the net interest margin for banks.  Uganda and all countries sample have a positive 
and significant coefficient on the real interest rates at 1% and 5% respectively signaling 
an increase in net interest margin as a result of an increase in interest rates. Currency 
appreciation as given by the positive and significant exchange rate coefficient for all 
countries and South Africa at 1% level indicates an increase in the net interest margin. 
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The model presents a mix of findings with regulatory capital having a significant impact 
in fifty percent of the sample and macroeconomic factors of GDP, interest rates and 
exchange rates showing significant influence in South Africa, Uganda and all countries.  
4.5.1. The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank liquidity 
Regulatory capital has a positive and significant coefficient for the samples for all 
countries, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda at 1% indicating an increase in the 
liquidity of the banks. The dummy variable for the sample for Kenya, Uganda and all 
countries shows a negative and significant coefficient at 10% (Kenya), 5% (Uganda) 
and 1% (all countries) which indicates a decline in liquidity post regulatory capital 
implementation.  
Interest rate increase in Uganda indicates an increase in the liquidity for banks. 
Exchange rates have a significant impact in Mauritius and all countries samples at 5% 
and 1% level respectively showing an increase in the liquidity.  
The insignificance of regulatory capital in these two samples could be a result of the 
size of the sample which is small at four and five banks respectively. The regulatory 
capital and macroeconomic variables are more significant in a larger sample as shown 
in the sample for all countries, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda.   
4.5.2. The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank solvency 
The effect of  regulatory capital as given by the positive and significant coefficient of 1% 
for the sample for Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda, all countries and 
South Africa at 5% indicates that an increase in the regulatory capital leads to an 
increase in the equity to total assets ratio.   
Periods following the regulatory capital requirements implementation show a positive 
and significant coefficient for samples in Botswana and all countries at 1% and 5% 
respectively indicating an increase in the equity to total assets ratio post Basel 
implementation. Exchange rate appreciation for the sample for all countries at 5% 
significance level indicates an increase in the solvency ratio.  
The model applies across the entire sample with the exception of Botswana.  
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4.5.3. The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank growth 
to total assets 
Regulatory capital has no significance influence on the growth to total assets across the 
entire sample. However evidence from the trend analysis shows that there was a 
decline in the growth of total assets post regulatory capital requirements implementation 
in the samples for Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda. 
GDP has a positive and significant coefficient for the sample for South Africa and all 
countries at 1% and 10% respectively indicating a growth in the growth to total assets 
ratio. A declining inflation rate for Namibia as shown by the negative and significant 
coefficient at 5% indicates an increase in the growth to total assets ratio. An 
appreciating exchange rate at 5% significance level for the sample for all countries 
shows an increase in the growth to total assets ratio.  
4.6. Summary 
Regulatory capital requirements have a positive and significant influence on bank’s net 
interest margin, liquidity and equity to total assets ratio. This view is confirmed by the 
evidence coming from the trend analysis for net interest margin and equity to total 
assets ratio. Evidence from the empirical analysis indicates that African banks hold high 
liquid assets.  
Macroeconomic   variables play significant and influential role in determining financial 
fragility and soundness of banks and should not be ignored when reviewing ways to 
minimize bank crises.
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Table 10: The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank efficiency 
 All countries Botswana Kenya Mauritius Namibia South Africa Tanzania Uganda 
Constant 2.93057*** 
(0.843324) 
13.4919*** 
(2.67103) 
17.3281 
(11.4356) 
2.44957 
(3.21428) 
2.91912*** 
(1.04353) 
2.49652 
(1.23284) 
7.55309*** 
(2.28719) 
13.1848*** 
(3.03209) 
Regulatory 
Capital 
0.0921552*** 
(0.0283304) 
-0.207632** 
(0.0917867) 
-0.0669983 
(0.0976386) 
0.0351726* 
(0.0203840) 
0.159364*** 
(0.0522255) 
0.0841328 
(0.0663005) 
-0.0126221 
(0.0266204) 
0.0279066 
(0.0269481) 
Post-Basel 
P.B 
 -1.67259*** 
(.452559) 
2.00063* 
(1.06202) 
-0.577198 
(2.36968) 
0.599005 
(0.742884) 
-0.40762 
(0.256832) 
-0.312847 
(0.279104) 
0.409877 
(0.945844) 
-1.85281 
(1.27477) 
GDP 0.0624049 
(0.0776100) 
0.0360847 
(0.062789) 
0.0189200 
(0.380481) 
0.0237942 
(0.101802) 
-7.9818e-05 
(0.000125185) 
0.129415*** 
(0.0472979) 
0.0962510 
(0.228119) 
-0.229343* 
(0.134863) 
Inflation rate 0.168110*** 
(0.0496431) 
-0.0017397 
(0.0448458) 
0.0610639 
(0.225058) 
-0.00735290 
(0.0723538) 
0.0239925 
(0.0580687) 
-0.00606136 
(0.0318390) 
-0.00631687 
(0.0804458) 
0.0327068 
(0.0676288) 
Interest rate 0.0934036*** 
(0.0331783) 
-0.0017397 
(0.0448458) 
0.0356554 
(0.188229) 
0.00620667 
(0.0854767) 
0.0130967 
(0.0357941) 
-0.0677015 
(0.120632) 
-0.0373737 
(0.0862154) 
0.0691268** 
(0.0341700) 
Exchange rate 
(LCU/USD) 
0.00116652*** 
(0.000260555) 
-0.38577 
(0.262221) 
-0.0833806 
(0.141477) 
-0.0150486 
(0.0857559) 
-00.0258052 
(0.105466) 
0.206810*** 
(0.0752064) 
-0.000508541 
(0.00167491) 
-0.000962102 
(0.00160577) 
F-statistic 7.175994 1.863474 0.262934 1.532280 2.637248 1.628645 0.104919 3.939831 
R-squared 0.149341 0.184257 0.012796 0.100500 0.338973 0.240515 0.006186 0.186875 
Number of 
banks 
55 5 10 9 4 4 14 9 
Number of 
observations 
671 75 150 104 44 44 126 128 
Source: Lynda Kahari 2016 
P-values are illustrated in parentheses *, ** and *** giving the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 11: The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank liquidity 
 All countries Botswana Kenya Mauritius Namibia South Africa Tanzania Uganda 
Constant 10.4103*** 
(2.92389) 
4.88028 
(25.4098) 
117.513*** 
(22.5725) 
-68.7208* 
(35.2207) 
13.2586 
(12.2141) 
4.28305 
(20.5909) 
93.7111*** 
(16.5137) 
15.9574 
(21.4185) 
Regulatory 
Capital 
1.34753*** 
(0.0982245) 
1.07349 
(0.873178) 
1.24609*** 
(0.192727) 
0.978891*** 
(0.223359) 
-0.451866 
(0.611281) 
0.333652 
(1.10735) 
1.15797*** 
(0.192201) 
1.24732*** 
(0.190360) 
Post-Base P.B -10.2997*** 
(1.56907) 
-11.1179 
(10.1031) 
-8.54320* 
(4.67746) 
5.39185 
(8.14021) 
2.82792 
(3.00612) 
-0.941833 
(4.66159) 
-0.137975 
(6.82906) 
-19.8373** 
(9.00493) 
GDP -0.692206** 
(0.269082) 
-0.538813 
(0.597319) 
-1.66422** 
(0.751025) 
0.810418 
(1.11550) 
-0.00108024 
(0.00146524) 
0.929618 
(0.789969) 
0.984958 
(1.64703) 
-0.969495 
(0.952662) 
Inflation rate -0.299204* 
(0.172118) 
-0.622001 
(1.62203) 
0.0604949 
(0.371543) 
0.839123 
(0.792822) 
0.694329 
(0.679672) 
-0.0960240 
(0.531774) 
-0.714342 
(0.580824) 
-0.522480 
(0.477726) 
Interest rate 0.0789383 
(0.115033) 
0.278986 
(0.426623) 
0.0604949 
(0.371543) 
0.196745 
(0.936617) 
-0.138199 
(0.418957) 
-1.01725 
(2.01480) 
-0.0827396 
(0.622481) 
0.455717* 
(0.241375) 
Exchange rate 
(LCU/USD) 
0.00464703*** 
(0.000903369) 
1.75495 
(2.49454) 
-1.23001*** 
(0.279258) 
2.09148** 
(0.939677) 
0.422454 
(1.23444) 
1.49622 
(1.25610) 
-0.0564512*** 
(0.0120930) 
0.00468011 
(0.0113431) 
F-statistic 22.36580 0.663348 15.58007 4.327336 1.028584 0.592918 12.88822 12.66912 
R-squared 0.353661 0.074422 0.434399 0.239853 0.166668 0.103372 0.433285 0.424967 
Number of 
banks 
55 5 10 9 4 4 14 9 
Number of 
observations 
671 75 150 104 44 44 126 128 
Source: Lynda Kahari 2016 
P-values are illustrated in parentheses *, ** and *** giving the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 49 | P a g e  
 
Table 12: The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank solvency 
 All countries Botswana Kenya Mauritius Namibia South 
Africa 
Tanzania Uganda 
Constant 1.93807** 
(0.914090) 
13.0446*** 
(3.34842) 
0.446550 
(9.22187) 
7.96096 
(8.82413) 
-2.86314 
(2.82129) 
1.62089 
(2.43385) 
7.71135 
(6.56796) 
-1.39426 
(5.75342) 
Regulatory 
Capital 
0.415555*** 
(0.0307077) 
0.0801794 
(0.115065) 
0.270575*** 
(0.0787376) 
0.731070*** 
(0.0559601) 
0.688093*** 
(0.141197) 
0.269831** 
(0.130889) 
0.397145*** 
(0.0764439) 
0.420307*** 
(0.0511343) 
Post-Basel 
P.B 
1.59416*** 
(0.490535) 
2.66221** 
(1.33136) 
2.64355 
(1.91095) 
-0.448827 
(2.03943) 
0.644271 
(0.694371) 
0.146825 
(0.551002) 
0.888869 
(2.71611) 
2.21209 
(2.41890) 
GDP 0.0125568 
(0.0841225) 
0.0607527 
(0.0787128) 
0.112674 
(0.306827) 
-0.0524640 
(0.279475) 
0.000133959 
(0.000338451) 
0.0563247 
(0.0933746) 
-0.481064 
(0.655072) 
0.109355 
(0.255903) 
Inflation rate 0.0996696* 
(0.0538089) 
0.00410855*** 
(0.056219) 
0.0611055 
(0.181491) 
-0.0901127 
(0.198632) 
0.0367508 
(0.156995) 
-0.0421065 
(0.0628559) 
-0.232907 
(0.231010) 
0.113410 
(0.128326) 
Interest rate 0.0184011 
(0.0359624) 
0.00410855 
(0.056219) 
0.00991532 
(0.151792) 
0.00983750 
(0.234658) 
0.101628 
(0.0967731) 
-0.107532 
(0.238150) 
-0.148374 
(0.247579) 
-0.0416100 
(0.0648379) 
Exchange 
rate 
(LCU/USD) 
0.000609282** 
(0.000282419) 
-0.453178 
(0.328723) 
0.0723033 
(0.114089) 
-0.247469 
(0.235425) 
0.184635 
(0.285137) 
0.196718 
(0.148471) 
0.00220124 
(0.00480972) 
0.00189024 
(0.00304696) 
F-statistic 16.25048 3.546849 2.371619 25.64374 4.084477 4.548609 4.489118 12.14158 
R-squared 0.284470 0.300661 0.104673 0.651550 0.442650 0.469342 0.210300 0.414609 
Number of 
banks 
55 5 10 9 4 4 14 9 
Number of 
observations 
671 75 150 104 44 44 126 128 
Source: Lynda Kahari 2016 
P-values are illustrated in parentheses *, ** and *** giving the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 13: The impact of implementing Basel regulatory capital on bank growth to total assets 
 All countries Botswana Kenya Mauritius Namibia South Africa Tanzania Uganda 
Constant 25.5583*** 
(5.78136) 
65.0325* 
(37.6291) 
16.7901 
(19.1420) 
0.449979 
(76.3251) 
32.2677*** 
(11.0313) 
-13.5246 
(22.1616) 
112.731*** 
(21.9548) 
51.3773 
(74.2265) 
Regulatory 
Capital 
-0.315649 
(0.194218) 
-0.123875 
(1.29308) 
-0.318314 
(0.248818) 
-0.0686285 
(0.484032) 
-0.831751 
(0.552086) 
-0.894866 
(1.19182) 
-0.347905 
(0.255530) 
-0.796661 
(0.659699) 
Post-Base P.B -11.6056*** 
(3.10250) 
3.11482 
(14.9616) 
3.35666 
(6.03879) 
-8.40426 
(17.6403) 
-3.23305 
(2.71501) 
2.99379 
(5.01718) 
-7.45495 
(9.07919) 
-12.9124 
(31.2069) 
GDP 1.00755* 
(0.532052) 
0.941509 
(0.884563) 
1.46700 
(0.969603) 
0.798517 
(2.41735) 
-0.00180435 
(0.00132335) 
4.06980*** 
(0.850227) 
0.684839 
(2.18972) 
2.32075 
(3.30148) 
Inflation rate -0.0971592 
(0.340326) 
0.280569 
(2.40205) 
1.40266** 
(0.573529) 
-1.10502 
(1.71809) 
-1.33017** 
(0.613855) 
0.754570 
(0.572338) 
-0.321885 
(0.772201) 
-0.847638 
(1.65558) 
Interest rate -0.190360 
(0.227452) 
-0.0625525 
(0.631782) 
0.274732 
(0.479677) 
0.916347 
(2.02970) 
-0.293595 
(0.378386) 
1.47259 
(2.16849) 
0.899297 
(0.827584) 
-0.761449 
(0.836493) 
Exchange rate 
(LCU/USD) 
0.00358060** 
(0.00178622) 
-7.44752** 
3.69414) 
3.35666 
(6.03879) 
0.646482 
(2.03633) 
0.743434 
(1.1149) 
1.50204 
(1.35191) 
-0.0597331*** 
(0.0160775) 
-9.46589e-05 
(0.0393097) 
F-statistic 2.412174 1.141144 2.525215 1.107181 1.340444 7.724763 4.272090 0.900187 
R-squared 0.055725 0.121513 0.110702 0.074701 0.206753 0.600326 0.202189 0.049891 
Number of 
banks 
55 5 10 9 4 4 14 9 
Number of 
observations 
671 75 150 104 44 44 126 128 
Source: Lynda Kahari 2016 
P-values are illustrated in parentheses *, ** and *** giving the level of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Bank fragility and financial crises have always generated a lot of interest amongst 
economists, policy makers, enterprises and academics because of the “special” role 
played by banks in an economy and the devastating effects that the world has 
experienced in the aftermath of global financial crises. There is a general quest for risk 
management tools and policies that can minimise the occurrence and impact of financial 
crises.  
This chapter is arranged into concluding remarks, recommendations, future research 
and summary.    
5.2. Concluding remarks 
The study concludes that Basel regulatory capital has a significant and positive 
influence on the intermediation role performed by banks in Africa whilst minimising 
fragility by enhancing bank solvency and liquidity.  Banks already enjoy high net interest 
margin even in period’s prior implementation of regulatory capital and the impact of 
regulatory capital is marginal. 
 
Interesting results from the regression show that implementation of regulatory capital 
does not have any significant influence on the growth of total assets. The study 
suggests that the growth to total assets is determined by macroeconomic variables; 
GDP growth, increasing interest rates, appreciating exchange rates and decreasing 
inflation. However, non-performing loans show that there was a general decline in 
nonperforming loans in the periods after the implementation of regulatory capital.  
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Trend analysis research suggests that African banks have always held high capital, 
hence the introduction of regulatory capital has minimal impact on the capital holdings.  
 
Observation from the literature review suggests that African banks have been slow to 
adopting the Basel Accords with most countries still attempting to implement Basel I and 
Basel II, and have not even embarked on Basel III.  
5.3. Recommendations 
From a regulator and bank perspective the results indicate the need to understand 
determines of financial fragility and the risk management tools available for use and 
their appropriateness to support financial stability.   
On macroeconomic policies, the results suggest that GDP growth, declining inflation, 
increasing real interest rates and appreciating exchange rates have a significant impact 
on minimising bank fragility. Results from the literature review suggest that Africa has to 
strengthen its legal institutions in terms of property rights, law enforcement, protection, 
political institutions to ensure effective adoption of Basel framework and minimising 
bank fragility.  
A decline in nonperforming loans post Basel regulatory capital implementation suggests 
that the Basel framework improves the quality of assets that banks hold. For 
governments attempting to stimulate economic development with the support of bank 
credit expansion programmes, reducing interest rates may stimulate the growth of credit 
supply.  
From a bank perspective the empirical analysis suggests that the banks have limited 
intermediation role. To deepen their role in intermediation banks in Africa may have to 
expand their product propositions and open up cheaper channels that enable depositors 
and borrowers to transact at lower costs.  
5.4. Future research 
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There are vast areas of research and relationships that need to be investigated with 
regards to the accords and their impact on the banking system. There is an opportunity 
to study regulatory arbitrage emanating from the implementation of regulatory capital 
framework in Africa by examining where the population that is denied loans from the 
banks because of high risk weights applied from the regulatory framework go to for 
credit.  
5.5. Summary 
Financial fragility is not only a result of weak internal controls and low capital adequacy 
but can be attributed to a combination of elements such as macroeconomic policies, 
exogenous shocks and global markets shocks. The Accords are more suited to 
elements that the banks themselves are in control of and not those that are imposed on 
it by outside forces. The research concludes that the Accords as a risk mitigation set of 
tools in the form of capital requirements does put banks in stronger position to withstand 
shocks that emanate from the banking systems i.e. contain contagion from failure in one 
institution and these accords seem not reduce the profitability of banks significantly that 
banks should not comply. 
Because the African banks do not engage in speculative activities to the extent that 
banks in developed countries do, some of the pillars and prescripts would not apply to 
African Banks and crisis emanating from such activities on the continent are limited. 
However, the researcher believes that it is rather safe than sorry, and build a banking 
system which takes into cognisance lessons of experience will safe guard against 
internally generated crisis. Policy makers should always be aware that policies that they 
enunciate should ensure that they protect the financial system lest its failure has dire 
consequences for the society.   
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Literature References 
Table 19: Review of the literature 
Author Region Findings 
Allen, F., & Gale, 
D. M. (2003).  
Global They define financial fragility as a situation which arises 
“when small shocks have disproportionately large 
effects”. The results from the model confirm that small 
shocks to the demand for liquidity may lead to either 
high volatility in asset-prices or bank defaults or both.  
Altman, (1968)  The paper demonstrates the pros and cons of the Z-
score model (1968) paper and the ZETA (1977) credit 
risk model. The ZETA score shows an improvement 
over the weaknesses of the Z-score. 
Arena, M. (2008).  Global 
 
The results show that systemic shocks emanating from 
both macroeconomic and liquidity have a significant 
impact on bank stability and triggered the crises in 
weak banks. It’s not only bank-level fundamentals that 
have significant effect on the likelihood of bank collapse 
but macroeconomic variables as well.  
Barker, D., & 
Holdsworth, D. 
(1993).  
Europe 
Union 
They developed a rating model that can be used to 
evaluate banking systems from different countries as 
well as individual banks. Their findings revealed that in 
the European Union countries during the period 2009 -
2013, 8 banking systems were in weak rating category, 
11 banking systems were in moderate rating category 
and 9 banking systems were in strong rating category. 
Barajas, A., Chami, 
R., Cosimano, T., & 
Martínez-Pería, M. 
S. (2004).  
Latin 
America 
Bank capitalization and lending activities in Latin 
America increased after Basel. There was no overall 
credit decline. Loan growth became more sensitive to 
some risk factors. Basel II might cause greater 
procyclicality of credit.  
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Basu, S. (2003).  The analysis suggest that the causes of bank failures 
largely emanate from poor credit standard 
requirements. Given that the environments that banks 
operate are filled with uncertainty, the bank has to 
provide for the means of recouping loans in the event of 
defaults. Hence there is always an element of fragility in 
the banking system arising from the uncertainty of loan 
repayments. In addition the paper shows that 
liberalisation of the financial system increases 
competition, which in turn means banks have to carry 
high credit risk which might lead to a bank collapse if 
the borrowers default. 
Beck, T., & Cull, R. 
(2013).  
Africa African banking systems are shallow but stable. African 
banks are well capitalized and over-liquid, but do not 
lend much to the private sector than banks in non-
African developing countries. African enterprises and 
households are less likely to use financial services than 
their peers in other developing countries. The paper 
also describes a number of financial innovations across 
the continent that can help overcome different barriers 
to financial inclusion and have helped to expand the 
bankable and the banked population.  
Blum, J., & Hellwig, 
M. (1995). 
Global Their findings show that capital adequacy regulation for 
banks may lead to macroeconomic volatility. Economic 
shocks may lead to a fall in the aggregate demand thus 
decreasing the ability of firms to service their debts to 
the banks. A decrease in firms servicing their banks 
loans reduces the bank equity. Coupled with capital 
adequacy requirements, this will reduce reduces bank 
lending and investment in the market. 
Bongini, P., East Asia They examine the performance of three indicators of 
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Claessens, C., & 
Ferri, G. (1999). 
bank fragility that can be calculated from available 
public information: accounting data, stock market 
prices, and credit ratings. Their evidence states that 
where information processing is quite costly, as in most 
developing countries, it is important to use 
simultaneously a number of indicators to assess bank 
fragility and that foreign holding in bank portfolios 
reduces bank distress. 
Bossone, B. 
(1999). 
Global The specialness of banks is attributed to their demand 
deposit liabilities and to their running the economy’s 
payment system. The specialness of banks is not going 
to change because of e-money  
Boyfield’s, (2009) UK Argues that consumers are turning to the less regulated 
markets of loan sharks to borrow money as regulation 
is squeezing them out of the regulated market of banks. 
Activities in the loan shark is on the increase as 
consumers find it hard to access credit. 
He further highlights the issues arising from the 
regulatory rules on leasing to SMEs as the same rules 
that apply to big corporations. 
Brownbridge, M. 
(2015).  
 
Sub-
Sahara 
Africa 
African banks hold a large amount of liquid assets as a 
percentage of their liabilities demonstrating that their 
role as financial intermediaries is very small. African 
banks earn a much higher net interest margin; have 
high non-performing loans to total loans ratio and have 
high overhead costs. Banks in the region have widely 
adopted Basel I Raising the minimum capital 
requirements and holding high capital is necessary for 
African banks as it will assist the banks in minimizing 
the risks posed by volatile economies. Capital 
requirements are not the only fundamental component 
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of the regulatory framework an effective banking 
supervision is also required.  
Brownbridge, M. 
(1998, March).  
Sub-
Sahara 
Africa 
The main cause of bank failures for local banks in 
Africa are; macroeconomic instability, liquidity support 
and prudential regulation, lending to high risk borrowers 
and insider lending. 
Blum, J. (1999).  The findings reveal that capital adequacy rules may 
lead to an increase in the bank’s riskiness. The model 
shows that an attempt by the regulators to reduce 
insolvency by bringing in capital regulation may result in 
a decline of bank profits, hence if a bank’s future profits 
are low there is no incentive for the bank to avoid 
default. In addition the model shows that the amount of 
equity and deposits does not directly impact the 
likelihood of default. Thus capital regulation may have 
unintended consequences. 
Cass, D., & Shell, 
K. (1983). 
 They state that uncertainty caused by external events 
does not matter in the Arrow-Debreu model. It however 
matters in a Pareto optimal model.  
Chandrasekhar, C. 
P. (2005). 
 Financial liberalization changes the structure of the 
financial system and the individual financial firms to 
mimic that of the developed countries such as the US 
and UK. Financial liberalization makes developing 
countries vulnerable to crises and deflationary 
environments that could lead to foreign investors 
acquiring domestic assets at low prices.  
Chang, R., & 
Velasco, A. (2000). 
 The results show that the exchange and monetary 
regimes have different impacts on the financial fragility 
bank, hence the choice of the exchange regime may 
determine the extent of the fragility.  The results show 
evidence of self-fulfilling runs 
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Cole, R. A., & 
Gunther, J. W. 
(1995).  
Global 
 
Indicators such as capital, troubled assets, and net 
income, are related significantly to the timing of bank 
failure. Variables such as bank liquidity, investment 
securities and large certificates of deposit - are not 
important determinants of bank failure. The survival 
time of failing banks is not related to bank asset size. 
Cumming, S., & 
Nel, H. (2005).  
 
South 
Africa 
The banks were able to achieve the regulatory capital 
by raising additional capital hence addressing the major 
concern of the Accords are that regulatory capital 
requirements would decrease the overall bank lending 
leading into an economic contractions. The banks 
moved to lower risk assets demonstrating that the risk 
weighted approach had achieved a more stable 
banking system. Findings show that regulatory capital 
requirements decrease credit supply to the private 
sector and increase the likelihood of high costs for 
loans.  
Chiuri, M. C., Ferri, 
G., &  
Emerging It shows that minimum regulatory capital requirements 
negatively impact the supply of credit especially in 
developing countries where its credit is most needed. It 
advocates for those responsible for global regulation to 
revise the capital regulation taking into consideration 
the problems faced by developing countries in 
complying to these regulations. 
Das, U. S., 
Quintyn, M., & 
Chennard, K. 
(2003). 
 It demonstrates that the quality of regulatory 
governance in form of best practices as adopted by the 
regulators is important to ensure a sound financial 
system. However, other factors such as  
Macro-economic, banking system structure, and the 
quality of political institutions and public sector 
governance is influential in determining financial 
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soundness.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., 
& Detragiache, E. 
(1997).  
 
 
Global The results suggest that crises tend to erupt when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when 
growth is low and inflation is high. High real interest 
rates are clearly associated with systemic banking 
sector problems, and there is some evidence that 
vulnerability to balance of payments crises has played a 
role. Countries with an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme 
were particularly at risk, as were countries with weak 
law enforcement 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., 
& Detragiache, E. 
(1998).  
 
 Their study finds that financial liberalization can 
increase the likelihood of banking crises especially in 
countries with weak institutional environment. Thus the 
strengthening of institutional framework and 
environment needs to be developed very early into the 
liberalization process. 
Diamond, D. W. 
(2007). 
 According to Diamond, the model depends on the fact 
that banks gather deposits so as to give their investors 
liquid assets. However, demand deposits only operate 
well under circumstances where there is confidence in 
the bank, in the event that confidence falls and there is 
a run on the bank, the bank becomes fragile. 
Diamond, D. W., & 
Dybvig, P. H. 
(1983). 
 Whilst the model is based on one bank it is useful in 
explaining banking. Bank runs in the model result in 
negative economic impact. However, the model show 
that the provision of deposit insurance can result in an 
improvement in the quality of contracts.  
Diamond, D. W., & 
Rajan, R. G. 
(1999).  
Global The main source of liquidity for banks comes from the 
deposits. Deposits make a bank structure fragile 
because they have to be paid out upon demand .Banks 
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can raise additional capital from external sources. 
Holding high levels of capital decreases the liquidity of 
a bank but enables the bank to withstand stress and 
survive crises. It points to overlooked side-effects of 
policies such as regulatory capital requirements and 
deposit insurance. 
Eichengreen, B., & 
Hausmann, R. 
(1999).  
 They examine the relationship between fragility and 
exchange rates, more so the problems of moral hazard 
emanating from the use of pegged exchange rate, the 
problem of using the domestic currency to borrow 
domestically and internationally. They offer a number of 
solutions to mitigate against these problems name; 
dollarization and emulating the Australian approach.  
Estrella, A., Park, 
S., & Peristiani, S. 
(2000).  
Global The regulatory capital ratios can be used to predict 
bank failures. Capital, leverage and capital to gross 
revenue ratios are simple and less costly than more 
complex risk weighted ratios. They can predict over a 
two year period horizon.  
Gropp, R., Vesala, 
J. M., & Vulpes, G. 
(2004).  
US The study shows that the most important determinants 
of bank capital structure is the “unobserved time-
invariant bank fixed-effects”. Deposit insurance has a 
very small role in the bank capital structures. 
Griffith-Jones, S., 
Segoviano, M. A., 
& Spratt, S. (2003). 
Developing Basel Accords may lead to a decrease in the supply of 
lending and an increase in the cost of lending to 
developing countries. The reduction in lending to 
developing countries can have dire consequences as 
they rely heavily on the funds for development agenda. 
Systemic risk can arise from the adoption of the IRB 
approach, as this is likely to increase procyclicality, thus 
increasing the probability of crises. Banks in developing 
countries are likely to face increased competition from 
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internationally active banks who are compliant with the 
Basel IRB approach and who have finely tuned their 
capital requirements. Accords might result in 
consolidation and acquisitions of smaller banks.  
Griffith-Jones, S., & 
Spratt, S. (2001).  
 
Developing Raise the concerns that the Basel risk based weights 
are not “fair” for developing countries because they 
incentivise the developing countries to seek OECD 
membership.  
The  (20%) risk-weights attached to short-term loans for 
emerging markets created “a bias in their favour whilst 
credit to non-OECD banks with over one year maturity 
was discouraged by a far higher 
(100%) risk weight.” This later contributed towards the 
Asian crisis of 1997/8 
Gottschalk Institute 
of Development 
Studies, UK 
31 May 2008 F 
Sub-
Sahara 
Africa 
The findings from the interview illustrate the key 
challenges faced by banks in SSA being the lack of 
technical skills and expertise to validate models and 
monitor their use; participation of foreign banks; 
competition; procyclicality; collaboration between home 
and host supervisors and credit portfolio concentration 
and credit to SMEs. 
Gropp, R., & 
Heider, F. (2010). 
 The results show that the negative distance to default is 
a good indicator of a bank fragility compared to equity 
based prices. Bond spread can be used as an indicator 
of fragility, it is however important to note that this might 
be difficult to calculate. In addition the paper 
recommends regulators to use equity market data as 
additional information for gauging bank fragility. 
Hardy, D., & 
Pazarbasioglu, C. 
(1998).  
 The empirical results suggest that a contemporaneous 
decrease in real GDP growth; inflation, credit 
expansion, capital inflows, rising real interest rates, 
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decline in exchange rates, declining capital output ratio, 
negative trade shock may lead to bank distress.  
Heffernan, S. 
(2003). 14.  
 
 Causes of bank failures: are weak asset management; 
managerial problems; fraud; role of regulators; too big 
to fail; lack of experience with relatively new financial 
products; ’cluster’: bank failures tend to cluster around 
a few years 
Hoggarth, G., Reis, 
R., & Saporta, V. 
(2002). 
Global Output losses incurred during crises in developed 
countries are as high, if not higher, on average, than 
those in emerging-market economies. Output losses 
during crisis periods in developed countries also appear 
to be significantly larger; 10–15% – than in 
neighbouring countries that did not at the time 
experience severe banking problems. In emerging 
markets, banking crises appear to be costlier only when 
accompanied by a currency crisis.  
Kane, E. J., & Rice, 
T. (2001). 
 According to the paper, the average time an African 
banking system spends to come out of a crises 
increases with the level of corruption. They show that 
depositors in Africa pay high costs which arise from the 
need for banks to mitigate against losses and the 
regulation that banks have to comply with. The main 
source of bank stress is from provided losses which 
might arise from the information asymmetry and 
effectiveness of supervision in reducing bank solvency. 
Kasekende, L., 
Ndikumana, L., & 
Rajhi, T. (2009).  
Africa Africa is not heavily integrated in the global financial 
system, its financial markets is still underdeveloped, 
foreign borrowings by banks is still regulated, limited 
diversification of stocks. The crises resulted in fall in 
demand and price of commodities, reduction in capital 
flows, and reduction in aid, capital outflows, and losses 
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in stock markets. 
Keister, T. (2015).  The model shows that in instances where there is 
aggregate risk in the economy, some of the risk can be 
carried by the state, the expectation to be bailed out 
might in the event of a financial crises disincentives 
intermediaries in carry out their role effectively. 
Probability of investors pulling out when faced with a 
crises is high.  
Kaufman, G. G. 
(1996). 
Global He argues that the optimum way to minimise systemic 
risk in the bank system is sound macroeconomic 
policies that “achieve stability and avoid price bubbles 
that leave banks highly vulnerable to failure.”  Given 
that it is difficult to maintain sound macroeconomic 
conditions, prudential regulation becomes important 
role in minimising bank failures. Regulation can 
introduce effective system of structured early 
intervention and resolution. 
Jickling, M 
2010 
 Discusses the causes of the financial crises of 2007 as; 
imprudent lending, housing bubble, global imbalances, 
securitisation, rating agencies, lack of transparency, off 
balance sheet, finance, market to market accounting, 
excessive leveraging 
Jones, D. (2000). Global 
 
Highlights the challenges that are faced by the 
regulators in the form of regulatory arbitrage. Key 
findings; regulatory capital arbitrage will quietly 
decrease the prescribed capital standards and this can 
go undetected as the existing Basel supervisory tools 
are not able to measure it. There is a close linkage 
between deposit insurance and capital regulation. 
Deposit insurance is designed to overcome the 
asymmetry of information in the banking system. 
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Gambacorta, L., & 
Mistrulli, P. E. 
(2004). 
Italy He finds that well capitalised banks can withstand 
shocks coming from monetary policies and GDP and 
are less procyclical. They can withstand these shocks 
because they can easily tap into non –deposit funds. 
He concludes that when assessing regulation on bank 
capital it is important to evaluate macroeconomic 
factors as well.  
Ladekarl, J., & 
Zervos, S. (2004). 
Africa This study hypothesizes that the determination of 
whether a country is investable or not is influenced by a 
number of factors, especially related to size, quality of 
“housekeeping” (macro-policies, political economy, 
local financial markets, corporate governance, etc.) and 
efficiency of “plumbing” (legal and regulatory 
framework, custody, clearing and settlement, taxes, 
etc.). 
Laeven, L., & 
Valencia, F. (2008). 
Global Systemic Banking Crises data base prepared by 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) provides data on banking 
crises for a large population of countries from 1970 to 
2007 and the policy resolutions. The data base builds 
on the work by Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and 
Noguera (2005) banking crisis database, and is the 
detailed database on banking. It has recorded one 
hundred twenty four episodes of banking crises 
between 1970 and 2007. 
Lagunoff, R., & 
Schreft, S. L. 
(2001).  
 They present a model in which agents’ “financial 
positions are linked through the diversified portfolios 
they hold and the payment commitments that emerge 
from credit market activity”. The model demonstrates 
the impact of shocks to the economy and how they can 
result in default by entrepreneurs on their payment 
commitments. Hence, subjecting some investors to 
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massive losses on their portfolios and because 
portfolios are connected, defaults can easily spread 
through the financial system, “allowing the shocks to 
have an impact far beyond their place of origin”. 
Moosa, I. A. 
(2010).  
 The Accord is criticized for: (i) allowing the use of bank 
internal models to determine capital charges, (ii) for 
boosting procyclicality; reliance on rating agencies, 
one-size-fits-all approach. He argues that financial 
integration may not be relevant given what happened in 
the financial crises of 2007.  
Naceur and Kandil 
(2013) 
 Their finding show that regardless of the introduction of 
regulatory capital, there was a growth in credit supply 
and assets. Credit expansion seems to be influenced 
by macroeconomic variables such as real growth, 
exchange rates, and cost of borrowing.  
Ragalevsky, S. V., 
& Ricardi, S. J. 
(2009). 
US The FDIC Office of the Inspector General gives the 
main cause of bank failures as inadequate governance, 
weak risk management and the lack of diversification 
(risk) or lending concentration. There are four stages in 
the life of a distressed bank; stage 1- the bank has 
incompetent management and no strategy, accords and 
standards; stage 2-  the bank experiences growth 
based on poor  
lending standards, oversights; stage 3 – deterioration 
and finally the bank failure 
Rodríguez, L. J. 
(2003).  
Global 
 
Bank regulations have become very complex, opaque, 
and with a multitude of rules tailored to cater to every 
possible constituency.  The process by which these 
rules are adopted has become increasingly 
burdensome, lengthy, and politicized.  Subordinated 
debt—that is, uninsured debt junior to all other claim is 
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one of the most effective market mechanisms for 
relaying information about a bank’s risk profile. The 
Basel committee should put greater emphasis on 
market discipline, innovation, and competition among 
regulatory regimes. Those factors will assist to promote 
the safety and soundness of the international financial 
system in a superior way.  
Sagner, J. S. 
(2010).  
US Concludes that Basel II resulted in decrease in lending, 
reduced economic activity, increased cost of bank 
capital, high costs of implementation and distortions in 
competition. 
Shehzad, C. T., & 
De Haan, J. (2009, 
January). 
 The results show that financial liberalisation decreases 
the probability of systemic crises.  
Scholtens, B., & 
Van Wensveen, D. 
(2000).  
Global Financial intermediaries operate under market 
emanating from information asymmetry. Whilst they will 
be able to decrease transaction and information costs, 
intermediaries are still faced with the agency problems 
and with moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Stiglitz, Joseph 
(May 2010).  
 The study highlights the problems presented by global 
integration, hence the conclusion that more integration 
might not be important for global economies.  
 
 
Tadesse, S. 
(2006). 
 
 
Global 
  
 
The study adds to the literature by highlighting that 
more disclosure and stricter external auditing standards 
are highly related to banking system stability.  The 
results demonstrates that greater disclosures can bring 
about real output losses as a result of instability. He 
further emphasizes the significance of ensuring the 
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credibility of the reporting. 
Thomson, J. B, 
1991. 
Global Concludes a bank failure is related to its solvency, 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality 
and the liquidity of the portfolio. Macroeconomic factors 
appear to have an impact on bank failure, and have a 
long term horizon i.e. four years before the bank failure. 
Finally, the proxy on the performance closure constraint 
indicates the probability that the bank will not only 
become insolvent but will be shut down.  
Williamson, S. D. 
(1986).  
 The study identifies a relationship between equilibrium 
credit rationing and financial intermediation. It shows 
intermediation as the dominant factor in borrowing and 
lending between individuals.” Equilibrium interest rates 
and the aggregate quantity of loans 
respond quite differently to changes in taste and 
technology parameters, depending on whether or not 
there is rationing in equilibrium.” 
VanHoose, D. 
(2007).  
Global The immediate effects of restricting capital standards is 
the likelihood of a decrease in total lending, an 
increases in market loan rates and a move away from 
lending to holding alternative assets. Conclusions 
indicates that risk-based capital requirements can build 
high capital holdings to protect depositors and deposit 
insurers from losses in the event of isolated or 
widespread bank failures. 
Vučković, S. 
(2010).  
 
Global Reviews regulation after the financial crises of 2007/08 
and argues that weak financial regulation was the major 
cause of the crises. Weak regulation resulted in 
problems of moral hazard and information asymmetry. 
Her concluding remarks are regulation should be aimed 
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at encouraging competition; protecting investors and 
participants; maintaining financial stability and assist in 
attaining macroeconomic stability 
 
The Effect of Regulatory Capital: End of Period Average Ratios 
Table 20: The effect of regulatory capital: End of period average ratios 
 End of period average ratios 
 Net 
interest 
margin 
Total 
capital 
Liquidity Equity 
to total 
assets 
Growth to 
total 
assets 
Non-performing 
loans 
Panel A: Bank behaviour before Basel  
All countries 
Botswana (2000 to 2009) 
Kenya (2000 -2012 
Mauritius (2000- 2009) 
Namibia (2000 – 2009) 
South Africa (2000 – 2009 
Tanzania (2000 – 2013) 
Uganda (2000 – 2007) 
 
7.90 
5.78 
10.43 
2.66 
5.24 
2.96 
7.12 
11.56 
 
18.86 
17.45 
19.52 
15.06 
14.47 
12.86 
18.73 
23.91 
 
33.15 
28.67 
34.04 
19.03 
13.35 
17.62 
35.33 
49.65 
 
11.23 
6.98 
12.64 
11.00 
9.12 
5.98 
12.24 
12.97 
 
24.89 
23.33 
20.98 
27.02 
16.18 
12.25 
27.61 
33.40 
 
92.05 
115.72 
86.54 
108.36 
81.16 
69.24 
73.69 
106.94 
Panel B: Bank behaviour after Basel  
All countries 
Botswana (2013 to 2014) 
Kenya (2013 -2014) 
Mauritius (2008- 2014) 
Namibia (2010 – 2014) 
South Africa (2010 – 2014) 
Tanzania (2014 – 2014) 
Uganda (2004 – 2014) 
 
5.84 
7.17 
9.53 
3.26 
4.76 
3.08 
7.12 
 
18.07 
18.72 
19.74 
16.22 
14.73 
14.99 
19.05 
22.99 
 
13.69 
9.36 
19.26 
13.97 
15.01 
7.17 
13.48 
15.87 
 
12.28 
10.08 
16.61 
11.35 
9.90 
7.13 
13.68 
 
23.75 
22.52 
14.21 
23.82 
16.42 
20.20 
23.57 
31.95 
 
95.36 
97.28 
80.51 
101.31 
92.21 
52.72 
63.18 
125.25 
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9.57 
 
16.32 
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Statistics  
Figure 17: All countries: Correlation Matrix  
 ETAR NPL LR NMIR TCR 
ETAR 1     
NPL 0.2066 1    
LR 0.2286 0.0918 1   
NIMR -0.0039 0.0079 0.0096 1  
TCR 0.5056 0.1210 0.5277 -0.0045 1 
 
Figure 18: All countries: Correlation Matrix   
 Exchange R Interest R Inflation GDP GTA 
Exchange R 1     
Interest R 0.2176 1    
Inflation 0.1025 -0.3586 1   
GDP 0.3977 0.0869 0.0247 1  
GTA 0.0853 -0.0136 0.0460 0.1179 1 
ETAR 0.2568 0.1009 0.0429 0.0839 -0.0339 
NPL 0.0377 0.0745 -0.0093 0.102 0.0291 
LR 0.2934 0.1747 -0.0021 0.0545 0.1083 
NIMR 0.0483 -0.0248 0.0474 0.0446 -0.0172 
TCR 0.3190 0.1934 -0.0008 0.1041 -0.0322 
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Figure 26: All countries Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
TCR 18.6561 16.7000 7.70000 58.0000 
NIMR 14.9127 6.62000 0.920000 5062.00 
LR 30.7576 25.4300 -0.0800000 110.090 
NPL 92.8966 71.6800 -38.8600 920.220 
ETAR 11.4991 10.7900 -17.6900 77.2800 
GTA 22.0350 16.9600 -35.5000 648.800 
GDP 5.12131 5.33000 -7.65000 12.2700 
Infl 7.88158 7.03000 -0.290000 26.2400 
IntR 7.76165 6.87000 -8.01000 23.0000 
ExchR 672.053 77.3500 4.69000 2599.79 
dummy 0.254844 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 
 
Variable Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
TCR 7.01744 0.376147 1.91863 4.42980 
NIMR 195.199 13.0895 25.8188 665.073 
LR 20.4598 0.665195 1.10825 0.586599 
NPL 78.6518 0.846660 3.71778 23.8708 
ETAR 6.07920 0.528666 2.14482 23.0988 
GTA 33.4698 1.51894 10.3520 182.799 
GDP 2.63217 0.513963 -0.838238 3.24125 
Infl 4.27607 0.542540 1.38872 3.65935 
IntR 6.39580 0.824026 0.114502 0.000303638 
ExchR 849.152 1.26352 0.779906 -0.966536 
dummy 0.436098 1.71124 1.12516 -0.734023 
 
Variable 5% Perc. 95% Perc. IQ range Missing obs. 
TCR 11.7000 33.0640 6.45000 0 
NIMR 2.12600 14.2240 4.63000 0 
LR 7.82200 74.8320 24.9800 0 
NPL 25.0940 248.404 55.4300 0 
ETAR 5.26000 21.2100 5.95000 0 
GTA -6.49400 63.5320 21.9600 0 
GDP 0.550000 8.71800 3.21000 0 
Infl 2.28000 14.4500 4.86000 0 
IntR -0.980000 18.3500 7.42000 0 
ExchR 6.14000 2177.56 1544.62 0 
dummy 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0 
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